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102 SELINSKY V. OI,SEN [38 0.2d 
[L. A. No. 22002. In Bank. Nov. 27, 1951.] 
MAX SELINSKY, Respondent, v. A. W. OLSEN, .Appellant. 
[1} Negligence- Instructions- Last Clear Chance.- Appellate 
court must view evidence most favorable to contention that 
last clear chance doctrine is applicable in reviewing order 
granting motion for new trial on ground of refusal to give an 
instruction on doctrine, since party invoking doctrine is en-
titled to an instruction thereon if the evidence so viewed could 
establish the elements of the doctrine. 
[2] Id.-Last Clear Chance-Elements of Doctrine.-Elements of 
last clear chance rule are that plaintiff has been negligent 
and, as a result thereof, is in a position of danger from which 
he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care, and this 
includes not only where it is physically impossible for him to 
escape, but also where he is totally unaware of his danger 
and for that reason unable to escape; that defendant has 
knowledge that the plaintiff is in such a situation, and knows, 
or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, that plaintiff 
cannot escape from such situation; and that defendant having 
the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordi-
nary care, fails to exercise the same, the accident results 
thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of 
such failure. 
[3a, 3b] Automobiles-Last Clear Chance.-Last clear chance doc-
trine was not inapplicable because plaintiff, whose car was 
struck while pulling away from curb, was aware of his dan-
gerous position where his motor stalled when his car was 
protruding into lane of traffic and jury could infer that he 
was incapable of extricating himself by exercise of ordinary 
care. 
[4} Negligence-Last Clear Chance.--Rule that there can be no 
recovery where negligence of injured party was contempo-
raneous, concurrent, continuing and contributory up to mo-
ment of impact does not mean that last clear chance doctrine 
is unavailable when plaintiff is negligent up to tim(" of colli-
sion, for his negligence is one of factors that brings it to play. 
[5] Automobiles-Last Clear Chance.-Under evidence most favor-
able to plaintiff, defendant could have seen plaintiff's auto-
mobile standing in road ahead of him for minute before im-
[1] See 19 Cal.Jur. 745, 760; 38 Am.Jur. 1055. 
[2] See 19 Cal.Jur. 651; 38 Am.Jur. 903. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 217; [2] Negligence, 
§48; [3,5] Automobiles, §152; [4] Negligence, §49; [6] Auto-
mobiles, § 305. 
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pact and thus could, by exercise of ordinary care, have avoided 
accident, where it appeared that defendant was looking 
straight ahead as he approached plaintiff's car, which had 
stalled while pulling away from curb, and that defendant's 
view was unobstructed. 
[6] !d.--Province of Court and Jury-Last Clear Chance.-Wherc 
evidence is conflicting, it is for jury to determine whether or 
not defendant had, by exercising ordinary care, the last clear 
chance to a vert a collision of vehicles . 
.APPEAr~ from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
.Angeles County granting a new trial. Otto J. Emme, Judge. 
Affirm e cl 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Order granting 
plaintiff a new trial, affirmed. 
Crider, Hunk1e & Tilson and E. Spurgeon Rothrock for 
Appellant. 
Edward Mosk for Respondent. 
CARTER, .J.-A motion for a new trial after judgment for 
defendant on the ground of refusal to give an instruction on 
the last clear chance doctrine was granted to plaintiff and 
defendant appeals. 
[1] vVe must view the evidence most favorable to the 
contention that the doctrine is applicable in reviewing the 
order appealed from, since plaintiff is entitled to an instruc-
tion thereon if the evidence so viewed could establish the 
elements of the doctrine. (Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35 Cal.2d 
16 [215 P.2d 728] ; Alberding v. Pritchard, 97 Cal.App.2d 443 
[217 P.2d 1012]; 19 Cal.Jur. 745.) 
Plaintiff's car w.as parked heading north, parallel to the 
curb in the parking· lane on the east side of Crenshaw Boule-
vard, a north-south street with four traffic lanes and two 
parking lanes. It was about a half block north of 8th Street, 
which crosses Crenshaw. One car was parked 5 or 6 feet in 
front and another at least 25 feet behind his. Plaintiff testi-
fied that he entered his car, looked through the rearview 
mirrors, one inside and the other outside the car, and the 
only cars he observed were westbound standing on 8th Street 
at the intersection waiting for the traffic signal to change. 
He pulled away from the curb and when the left front end 
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of his car was protruding 2 feet into the outside traffic 
lane his motor stalled and his ear stopped. About five seconds 
later, according to plaintiff, and a minute according to an-
other witness, and while plaintiff's car was still stopped, 
defendant, proceeding north on the outside traffic lane on 
Crenshaw, collided with the left front of plaintiff's car. 
Defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff's car until 
he was 15 feet behind the front of it, but admitted, and the 
evidence shows, that his view was unobstructed between the 
8th Street intersection and plaintiff's car; that be was looking 
straight ahead and could have seen a car protruding as plain-
tiff's did for a distance of 50 feet to the south of it; and that 
he was traveling 20 to 25 miles per hour. He testified first 
that he tried to swerve to the left and later that he did not 
remember, and that he applied his brakes when he saw plain-
tiff's car. 
[2] 'fhe elements of the last clear chance rule are "[1] 
That plaintiff has been nrgligent and, as a result thereof, 
is in a position of danger from which he cannot escape by the 
exercise of ordinary care; and this includes not only where 
it is physically impossible for him to escape, but also in cases 
where he is totally unaware of his danger and for that reason 
unable to escape; [2] that defendant has knowledge that the 
plaintiff is in such a situation, and knows, or in the exercise 
of ordinary care should know, that plaintiff cannot escape 
from such situation, and [3] has the last clear chance to avoid 
the accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to exercise 
the same, and the accident results thereby, and plaintiff is 
injured as the proximate result of such failure.'' (Girdner v. 
U11Jion Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 202 [13 P.2d 915] .) 
[3a] Defendant contends that the doctrine is not here 
applicable because plaintiff was aware of his dangerous posi-
tion and could have saved himself by the exercise of ordinary 
care; that is, the first element is lacking." [4] Further in 
that connection, the rule is asserted to be that there can be 
no recovery where the negligence of the injured party was 
contemporaneous, concurrent, continuing and contributory up 
to the moment of the impact. ·while the foregoing statement 
may be correct wht>n properly applied, considerable confusion 
has arisen from it because it has been applied where the last 
clear chance doetrine has been unsuccessfully relied upon. 
In effect, it merely means that one of the elements of the 
doctrine is lacking; or that plaintiff's contributory negligence 
is a bar to his recovery. (Girdner v. Union Oil Co., supra, 
Nov.1951] SELINSKY v. OLSEN 
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216 Cal. 197.) It does not mean that the doctrine is unavailable 
when plaintiff is negligent up to the time of the collision, 
for his negligence is one of the factors that brings it into 
play. (Girdner v. Union Oil Co., supra, 216 Cal. 197.) 
[3b] It may be true that plaintiff was negligent in pulling 
away from the curb and was aware of his dangerous position, 
but when his car was protruding into the lane of traffic, his 
motor stalled, and the jury could infer that he was incapable 
of extricating himself by the exercise of ordinary care. Plain-
tiff's car was stopped from five seconds to a minute before 
the collision. There is a conflict on that point but it should 
have been left to the jury under the last chance doctrine 
instruction. We hold, therefore, that the first element finds 
support in the evidence. 
[5] The second factor is lacking, urges defendant, because 
there is no showing that defendant was aware of plaintiff's 
perilous position or knew he could not escape therefrom. That 
depends upon the view one takes of the evidence. It is true 
that defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff's car 
until he was directly behind it, when plaintiff drove his car 
into the line of traffic in front of him, and that plaintiff's 
car was in motion at the time of the impact. Other evidence 
shows, however, that defendant was looking straight ahead 
as he approached plaintiff's car and his view was unobstructed. 
It may be inferred therefrom that he saw plaintiff's motionless 
car extending into the line of traffic. (Hoy v. Tornich, 199 
Cal. 545 [250 P. 565]; Bailey v. Wilson, 16 Cal. .App.2d 645 
[61 P.2d 68]; Hellman v. Bmdley, 13 Cal..App.2d 159 [56 
P.2d 607] ; Handley v. Lombardi, 122 Cal.App. 22 [9 P.2d 
867]; Ba;ird v. James A. Hill Canst. Co., 138 Cal.App. 410 
(32 P.2d 390]; Galwey v. Pacific Auto Stages, Inc., 96 Cal. 
App. 169 [273 P. 866] .) Thus we do not have a case in which 
plaintiff's car was in motion or suddenly appeared in defend-
ant's path as existed in the authorities relied upon by defend-
ant. The jury could have inferred also, that defendant knew 
or should have known, in the exercise of ordinary care, that 
plaintiff could not escape. Under the evidence most favorable 
to plaintiff, defendant could have seen plaintiff's car standing 
in the road ahead of him for a minute before the impact and 
thus could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the 
accident. 
[6] The third element was not established, says defendant, 
because he could not have avoided the collision, having neither 
time nor means to do so. It was for the jury to determine 
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whether in the space of time involved he could have avoided 
the collision. From a photograph of Crenshaw Boulevard, 
put in evidence, and which is pertinent to the issue (H1tetter 
v. Andrews, 91 Cal.App.2d 142, 146 [204 P.2d 655]), it ap-
pears that the distance between the cars parked along the 
curb and the first white line between the two traffic lines, 
defendant could have swerved to the left without crossing 
that line to avoid colliding with plaintiff's car. Moreover, 
it will be remembered that Crenshaw Boulevard had two lanes 
for northbound traffic. Defendant could have swerved left 
over to the lane next to the center line. True, defendant 
testified that there was a car traveling in that lane slightly 
to his rear, but the jury could have disbelieved that testimony. 
It was vague. Defendant said he did not see the car; that he 
was ''conscious'' of it-'' possibly heard'' it. He also said 
there was not enough room to avoid plaintiff's car without 
crossing the white line, but when shown the photograph, 
stated that it "looked wider." Thus, we believe it was a 
matter for the jury to determine. vVe cannot say as a matter 
of law that he did not, by exercising ordinary care, have the 
last clear chance to avert the collision-something more than 
a split second possible chance. 
A case clearly similar is Gi·rdner v. Union oa Co ..• supra, 
216 Cal. 197, in which the doctrine was held applicable. There 
plaintiff had his car moving in an intersection and was ob-
livious of defendant's approach thereto in a truck. The latter 
first saw plaintiff's car when 40 to 50 feet from it and was 
traveling about 20 miles per hour. Here it may be inferred 
that defendant saw plaintiff's car standing and obstructing 
the traffic line for a distar.ce of about 50 feet, and at that 
time defendant was traveling 20 to 25 miles per hour. (See, 
also, Bonebrake v. JJ1c0ormick, supr-a, 35 Cal.2d 16; Giorgetti 
v. Wollaston, 83 Cal.App. 358 [257 P. 109] ; Podeszwa v. White, 
99 Cal.App.2d 777 [222 P.2d 683]; Yates v. JJ!orotti, 120 
Cal.App. 710 [8 P.2d 519] .) 
The negligence of defendant could have consisted of his 
failure to keep a proper lookout ahead to observe vehicles 
in his path, which negligence was the proximate cause of the 
accident. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred in the 
judgment. 
